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Abstract
The majority of states in the U.S. now fund merit-based financial aid programs, the
effects of which depend on how strongly students react to changes in college costs. I
estimate such reactions using quasi-experimental aspects of a recent Massachusetts
merit scholarship program intended to attract talented students to the state’s public
colleges. This paper is the first to document heterogeneity in price sensitivity among
students of varying academic abilities. My primary result is that, in spite of its small
monetary value, the scholarship induced 6% of winners to choose four-year public
colleges over four-year private colleges, the average of a large effect on the lowest abil-
ity winners and no effect on the highest ability winners. The bulk of funds nonethe-
less flowed to students who would have attended public colleges anyway, and the
scholarship had no effect on the overall college attendance rate, which for winners
was already above 90%. These findings have implications for the design of future
government-sponsored financial aid programs.
∗For their many helpful comments, I thank Janet Currie, Susan Dynarski, Thomas Kane, David Lee,
Johannes Schmieder, Miguel Urquiola and the participants of Columbia’s Applied Microeconomics Collo-
quium. I am also grateful to Robert Lee at the Massachusetts Department of Education, who generously
provided me with data and explanations of various aspects of Massachusetts’ school system.
College costs in most industrialized countries have increased rapidly in recent years,
presenting a serious public policy dilemma given most governments’ stated goals of
maintaining or improving access to higher education.1 Different countries have adopted
different approaches to address this dilemma, in a continual search for the optimal form
and extent of state support for students. Germany has, for example, experimented with
transforming a large fraction of student loans into outright grants. Great Britain, Australia
and New Zealand have increased students’ use of income contingent loans, in which each
student’s repayment amount depends upon her current ability to repay the loan. Merit-
based financial aid, in which student support is contingent on demonstrated academic
ability, has become increasingly common in both Canada and the United States. This last
form of student support is the focus of this paper.
In the U.S., the increased popularity of merit-based aid can be partly explained by
rapidly rising college costs. From 2000 to 2005, the price (tuition and fees) of public and
private colleges rose annually by an average of 9.1% and 5.6% respectively, far exceeding
the inflation rate of 2.5%. Public concern over these increases has made political programs
to reduce such costs quite popular. State governments have reacted particularly strongly
to these political pressures; since 1980 the amount of financial aid offered by the states has
more than doubled relative to that offered by the federal government. By 2005, state and
local governments were spending $59 billion (7.4% of revenue) on students enrolled in
public postsecondary institutions, in the form of both financial aid for students and direct
support for those institutions.2
As the states have increased their funding for financial aid programs, they have also
shifted the mix of funding away from purely need-based programs and toward programs
based partially or solely on academic merit. By 2005, 31 states were providing under-
1For more on the challenges facing U.S. and European higher education, see Heller and Rogers (2006).
2Postsecondary education facts in this paragraph come from Heller (2002) and from Tables 280 and 282
of U.S. Census Bureau (2005).
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graduate financial aid at least partly on the basis of merit. This merit-based aid totalled
$2.1 billion (29% of all state-based financial aid), of which $1.2 billion was based solely
on merit and $0.9 billion was based on a combination of merit and need.3 Advocates ar-
gue that these programs raise college attendance rates, incentivize student achievement,
prevent state-level brain drain, and reduce the financial burden of college. Opponents of
these programs argue that targeting aid based on merit rather than need diverts funds to-
ward high-income students and away from those low-income students whom the funds
would most benefit.
Evaluating merit-based programs depends in large part upon understanding how stu-
dents, particularly at the upper end of the ability distribution, respond to changes in the
costs of various college options. My analysis below answers this question in the context
of Massachusetts’ Adams Scholarship, a merit scholarship that is assigned on the basis of
a state-administered standardized test score and that reduces the price of in-state public
colleges by about 17%, or $1,700 a year. The program was intended by legislators primar-
ily to attract more talented students to the state’s public colleges. Using data provided by
the state’s Board of Education, I exploit two quasi-experimental aspects of the scholarship
in order to identify its effects. First, the scholarship was introduced relatively unexpect-
edly, allowing me to construct a difference-in-difference estimator, comparing the college
attendance patterns of winners and losers in the years before and after the scholarship
began.4 Second, the scholarship was awarded on the basis of standardized test scores,
allowing me to use a regression discontinuity design that compares college attendance
patterns of students just above and below the threshold eligibility score.
3U.S. merit aid data come from Table 8 of National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs
(2006). Gucciardi (2004) finds that Canada now spends $200 million annually on merit scholarships, of
which $80 million or so comes from the national or provincial governments.
4As I explain in Section 4, the status of “winner” or “loser” in years prior to the scholarship’s existence is
imputed by determining whether, based on her test scores, a given student would have won the scholarship
had it then existed.
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This paper makes at least four contributions to the literature on financial aid gener-
ally and merit-based scholarships specifically. First, my analysis is based on a very clean
quasi-experiment and student-level data for every Massachusetts high school graduate
from 2003-2005, making the estimated effects more convincing than much of the previ-
ous literature on merit scholarships. Second, because my data contains detailed test score
information, I can explore heterogeneity in price sensitivity among students of varying
academic abilities, which no previous paper has done. Third, the Adams Scholarship
grants students much less money than do the most widely studied merit scholarships, al-
lowing measurement of students’ reactions to financial incentives that are arguably quite
small. Finally, receipt of the scholarship is automatic, so that my results do not suffer
from the selection bias potentially confounding evaluation of those aid programs requir-
ing applications.
My primary result is that, in spite of its small monetary value, the Adams Scholarship
induced roughly 6% of winners to choose four-year public colleges instead of four-year
private colleges, showing that students are quite sensitive to small differences in costs.
The scholarship had little or no effect on the overall college attendance rate, which among
winners was already above 90%. Even with this fairly large reaction, the bulk of funds
flowed to those students who would have attended public colleges absent the scholarship.
Winners with relatively low academic ability had particularly strong reactions to the price
change, while the highest ability winners had little or no reaction. This is presumably due
to the fact that the highest ability winners secure admission to the highest quality private
institutions and that the Adams Scholarship is worth too little to those students to induce
a large sacrifice in college quality. I also find that low-income winners react strongly
to the scholarship, but that this effect diminishes when I control for academic ability.
Previous research may have mistaken heterogeneity by academic ability for heterogeneity
by income, given the commonly observed correlation between income and test scores.
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My results have implications both for the general design of financial aid programs and
for evaluating the Adams Scholarship program in particular. In general, governments de-
signing financial aid programs should understand the characteristics of the targeted stu-
dent populations, paying particular attention to existing relations between academic abil-
ity, income and students’ college attendance decisions. Programs based purely on need
may subsidize the college educations of those whose academic ability is too low for the
benefits of college to outweigh the costs, while programs based purely on merit run the
risk of channeling aid to those students most likely to attend college anyway. Optimally
designed aid programs would target those students whose academic ability suggests they
would benefit from college but whose incomes imply a relatively high probability that
they do not enroll.
The Adams Scholarship is particularly poorly designed in this regard. Its goal of mov-
ing students from private to public colleges has questionable economic value at best, par-
ticularly given potential alternative uses of the $30 million annually devoted to the schol-
arship. Even taking that goal as worthwhile, the program would have induced greater
movement to public colleges per dollar spent had its eligibility rules included a low-
income criterion. I present evidence for Massachusetts that high-ability, low-income stu-
dents are less likely to attend four-year college than their higher income peers of similar
ability. This suggests some scope for a potentially efficient state intervention that tightly
targets aid to high-ability, low-income students.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews previous literature on the effects of
financial aid and merit scholarships. Section 2 explains the details of the Adams Scholar-
ship. Section 3 reviews the data and describes the population of students in question. In
Sections 4 and 5, I use the difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity method-
ologies to estimate the impact of the Adams Scholarship on students’ college attendance
decisions, while in Section 6 I explore heterogeneity in these reactions by academic abil-
4
ity. Section 7 discusses the implications of my findings for the design of financial aid
programs.
1 Previous Literature
This paper is related to two strands in the economics and education literatures. The first
strand is research on student reactions to financial aid. Although an extensive empirical
literature has studied the relation between college costs and college attendance decisions,
until the last decade or so the literature has suffered from omitted variable bias because
variation in costs is not exogenous to unobserved determinants of schooling. In the U.S.,
exploration of various quasi-experiments has helped alleviate this problem. Such quasi-
experiments include changes in Pell grant rules, as in Seftor and Turner (2002); the effect
of GI bills, as in Bound and Turner (2002); within-state tuition changes, as in Kane (1995);
elimination of Social Security student benefits, as in Dynarski (2003); and discontinuities
in a school’s financial aid formula, as in van der Klaauw (2001).5 Reviewing this recent
literature, Dynarski (2002) concludes that the evidence consistently suggests that eligibil-
ity for $1,000 in annual aid raises college attendance rates by about 4 percentage points,
but notes that the studies are evenly split on the question of whether college subsidies
have a greater impact on low- or high-income students. The central result of this liter-
ature is that financial aid has a substantial impact on the college decisions of American
high school graduates.
The second strand focuses specifically on the design and effects of American merit
5I know of only one quasi-experimental estimate of the affect of financial aid on European students’
college enrollment decisions. Baumgartner and Steiner (2005) find no evidence that an exogenous trans-
formation of student loans to non-repayable grants had an effect on college enrollment rates of German
students. There is, however, a larger European quasi-experimental literature on the effect of college costs
on time to degree completion, a particular challenge for European universities whose students often take
full advantage of the low costs of attendance. Garibaldi et al. (2007) reviews this literature and finds that in
Italy, raising college costs does motivate students to complete their studies significantly faster.
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scholarship programs. Opponents of merit-based financial aid focus on the strong associ-
ation between measures of merit and high socioeconomic status. Heller and Rasmussen
(2002) show that this association causes Florida and Michigan, two of the largest funders
of merit-based aid, to have disproportionately low representation of low-income students
in their pool of merit scholarship winners. The authors argue that this diminishes the
ability of the scholarships to raise college attendance rates, which are lowest among low-
income students. Heller (2004) predicted that the design of the Adams Scholarship would
similarly leave few disadvantaged students in the pool of winners. As I show in Section
4, his predictions were largely correct.
Previous evaluations of the effects of small state-run merit scholarship programs tend
to suffer from data limitations and selection bias. Binder and Ganderton (2004) try to
evaluate the effect of a New Mexico merit scholarship but have individual level data only
for students enrolled in the University of New Mexico, as well as institution level data
for colleges, which prevents analysis of non-attenders. St. John (2004) looks at programs
in Washington and Indiana that award scholarships to high school students pledging to
adhere to a set of behavioral and academic standards, but the study suffers from the fact
that students choosing to make this pledge are likely different in important ways from
their non-pledging counterparts.
The best evaluations of scholarship programs based on merit have focused on two
states with the largest such programs, Georgia and California.6 Dynarski (2000) uses data
from the Current Population Survey to estimate the effects of Georgia’s HOPE Scholar-
ship Program, whose goal was to raise in-state college attendance rates from their base
level of 30%. The scholarships granted free attendance at Georgia’s public colleges to state
residents with at least a B average in high school, regardless of income level. The maxi-
6Though these two states are the largest spenders on merit-based financial aid, Florida is not far be-
hind, spending $270 million annually on its Bright Futures Scholarship. To my knowledge, no convincing
evaluation of this program has yet been published and thus might provide material for future research.
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mum annual value of the scholarship during the time period studied was roughly $3,500
(in 2005$). Using a difference-in-difference approach, Dynarski explores the change in
college attendance rates around the time of the introduction of the scholarship program,
using other southeastern states as a control group. She finds that the program increased
Georgia’s college attendance rate by over 7 percentage points but argues that the effect
was concentrated among white students, likely due to the correlation between race, in-
come and high school grades.
Cornwell et al. (2006) update this analysis in more detail using IPEDS data on Geor-
gia’s postsecondary institutions. They roughly agree with Dynarski’s estimate of the in-
creased attendance rate, but conclude that both black and white students exhibited such
an increase. They also estimate that much of the apparent increase stems from students
choosing Georgia institutions over out-of-state ones, and that ultimately only 15% of
scholarship winners changed their college decision based on the increased aid. This last
result is remarkably similar to mine. Nonetheless, unlike this paper, neither Dynarski nor
Cornwell et al. has data that permits closer examination of high school students making
their college decision.
More satisfying in this regard is Kane’s (2003) evaluation of California’s CalGrant pro-
gram, which gave college grants worth up to $11,000 annually (in 2005$) to federal finan-
cial aid applicants who had achieved a minimum high school GPA and fell below certain
income and asset limits. The largest grants were given to students attending private col-
leges because the state wanted to ease capacity constraints in its public postsecondary
system. Kane evaluates the effect of CalGrant using detailed student information from
federal financial aid applications and exploiting the multiple discontinuities inherent in
the program design (minimum GPA, maximum income and maximum assets). That the
GPA threshold was determined late in the process by state funding availability elimi-
nates the possibility that students more desirous of aid tried “to claw their way above the
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threshold,” which would invalidate the smoothness assumption underlying regression
discontinuity techniques.
Kane concludes that the grants caused a 3-4 percentage point rise in college enrollment
among financial aid applicants and caused low-income applicants to more than double
their rate of private college attendance (from 15% to over 30%). Though the paper’s iden-
tification strategy is quite convincing, it suffers from two limitations. First, selection ef-
fects may bias the results, given that only students filing the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA) were considered for grants and are thus in his data. Second, and
more important, the regression discontinuity design allows Kane to estimate the effects
of the grants only for students near the GPA threshold. As I will show below, my data
and the design of the Adams Scholarship rule out any selection bias, while my empiri-
cal approach allows investigation of the heterogeneity in students’ reactions by varying
academic ability.
The above papers make clear that a merit-based financial aid program can have a sig-
nificant impact on a student’s decision whether to attend college at all and, if so, whether
to attend in the public or private sector. Also clear is that states’ merit-based scholarships
vary widely both in their goals and in their designs, which differ as to award values and
eligibility criteria. Evaluation of these programs requires consideration of whether the
goals are sensible and whether the design efficiently achieves those goals. I argue below
that the Adams Scholarship fails both of these tests and that understanding why this is so
will aid in the design of future merit-based scholarship programs.
2 The Adams Scholarship Program
In 10th grade, all public high school students in Massachusetts take the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), which includes an English Language Arts
8
portion and a Mathematics portion.7 On each portion of the MCAS, students’ scores,
which range in multiples of two from 200 to 280, are categorized in descending order as
“advanced” (260-280), “proficient” (240-258), “needs improvement” (220-238), or “warn-
ing/failing” (200-218). In January 2004, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney proposed
the John and Abigail Adams Scholarship Program8, which would waive tuition at any
Massachusetts community college, state college or University of Massachusetts (U. Mass.)
campus for those students whose combined English and mathematics scores on the MCAS
placed them in the top 25% statewide. This announcement met with huge political op-
position from state legislators concerned that the waivers would go largely to students in
wealthy, high-performing school districts.
In October 2004, the state Board of Higher Education voted to accept a modified ver-
sion of the proposal in which a student must satisfy two criteria in order to receive a
tuition waiver. First, her combined English and mathematics score must place her in the
top 25% of students in her own school district rather than the whole state, a condition
designed to alleviate the aforementioned political opposition. Each district is thus as-
sociated with a cutoff score representing the 75th percentile of its students’ total scores.
Second, she must score in the “advanced” (≥260) category on one portion of the exam
and in the “proficient” (≥240) or “advanced” category on the other portion, thus requir-
ing a total MCAS score of at least 500. This objective threshold helped satisfy those who
7Information on Massachusetts’ educational system and the Adams Scholarship Program comes from
http://www.doe.mass.edu. The history of and reactions to the Adams Scholarship come from Russell and
Vaishnav (2004), Russell (2004a), Russell (2004b), Russell (2005), and Jan (2005), as well as my discussions
with Robert Lee and others at the Massachusetts Department of Education.
8The eponymous couple placed great value on education. John Adams wrote, in 1780, that “I must study
politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to
study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce,
and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary,
tapestry, and porcelain.” His wife, Abigail Adams, may have agreed with her husband’s sentiment but not
with his single-sex phrasing of the issue. She once wrote, “It is really mortifying, sir, when a woman
possessed of a common share of understanding considers the difference of education between the male and
female sex, even in those families where education is attended to.” Mrs. Adams would likely have been













































































Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Scholarship Eligibility
objected that scholarships might be granted to low-performing students in even lower-
performing school districts.
Figure 1 provides a graphical interpretation of scholarship eligibility in different types
of school districts. In all three panels, students must pass the same proficient/advanced
threshold represented by the thick solid line. Students must also achieve their own dis-
trict’s cutoff score, represented by the thick dashed line. Scholarship winners are those
students whose test scores fall in the shaded region. In a high-performing district, as in
the top left panel, the district’s cutoff score is so high that the proficient/advanced con-
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straint does not bind. In a medium-performing district, as in the top right panel, the
district’s cutoff score interacts with the proficient/advanced threshold in a complex way.
In the lowest-performing districts, as in the bottom panel, the district’s cutoff score is
so low that passing the proficient/advanced threshold is sufficient to win a scholarship.
In the class of 2005, roughly 18% of students came from low-performing districts with
cutoff scores less than or equal to 500, 32% came from high-performing districts with
cutoff scores greater than or equal to 520, and the remaining 50% came from medium-
performing districts with cutoff scores from 502 to 518.
Students who qualify for an Adams Scholarship are automatically notified by letter
in the fall of their senior year that they have been granted free tuition at any of fifteen
(two-year) community colleges, seven (four-year) state colleges, or four U. Mass. cam-
puses.9 As Table 1 shows, receipt of the scholarship far from eliminates the cost of college
attendance. In fact, for the high school class of 2005 (the first to be eligible for the Adams
Scholarship), tuition at individual public colleges in Massachusetts ranged from only 16-
24% of direct cost of attendance, with fees making up the remaining portion. Community
college students paid an annual average of $740 in tuition and $2,782 in fees, state college
students paid $961 in tuition and $4,389 in fees, and U. Mass. students paid $1,575 in
tuition and $7,612 in fees. These figures imply that the average annual (total) value of the
Adams Scholarship was $740 ($1480) for community college students, $961 ($3,846) for
state college students, and $1,575 ($6,299) for U. Mass. students.
The Adams Scholarship thus differs from other studied merit-based aid programs
both in award value and in its definition of merit. The maximum Adams Scholarship
award is roughly half the value of a HOPE award and one-sixth the value of a CalGrant
award.10 Dynarski (2004) lists over a dozen states’ merit-based aid programs in which the
9After receiving that letter, a student must then file a FAFSA and must enroll in college the semester
immediately following his high school graduation. He must also maintain a 3.0 grade point average in
college in order to continue receiving the tuition waiver.
10One official at the Massachusetts Department of Education told me that there was already political
11
Table 1: Average Costs of Massachusetts’ Public Colleges, 2005/06
1 Year Total (2 or 4 years) Tuition as
N Tuition Fees Tuition Fees % of Cost
University of Mass. 4 $1,575 $7,612 $6,299 $30,448 17.1%
State colleges 7 961 4,389 3,846 17,557 18.0%
Community colleges 15 740 2,782 1,480 5,563 21.1%
Source: Massachusetts Board of Higher Education: Fiscal Policy (Tuition and Fee Survey)
definition of merit is loose as to include over 30% of the student population, including
some where the proportion is much greater. Under Arkansas’ definition, 60% of its stu-
dents qualify for merit-based aid. The Adams Scholarship, in contrast, is awarded to less
than 25% of graduating Massachusetts seniors.
The primary goals of the program seem to be keeping talented students from leav-
ing the state and improving the quality of Massachusetts’ public colleges. At a June 15,
2004 meeting of the state Board of Higher Education, Governor Romney “explained that
the Abigail and John Adams Scholarship will attract Massachusetts students to stay in
Massachusetts by providing a special incentive to our brightest students.... It is a priority
to attract the very best students to our public colleges.”11 The Board of Higher Educa-
tion’s website now lists as one of the scholarship’s purposes, to “help attract more high-
performing students to Massachusetts public higher education.” It is not clear why this
particular priority is an economically sensible use of the state’s education budget. Keep-
ing talented students in state might be worth the expenditure if in the long run students
tend to settle where they attend college, but recent work by Groen (2004) shows that, at
most, 10% of students induced to stay in-state will remain in that state’s labor market 10-
15 years later. Also, there is no reason to assume, given Massachusetts’ impressive set of
pressure on the state government to extend the scholarship to cover fees as well as tuition, after parents of
scholarship winners realized that free tuition was worth much less than they had initially believed.
11Minutes of the meeting can be found at http://www.mass.edu/p p/home.asp?id=5.
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Table 2: Mean Characteristics of Massachusetts’ Four-Year Colleges
SAT Score Percentiles
Verbal Math 2005/2006
N 25th 75th 25th 75th Tuition and Fees
Private colleges 56 529 615 533 618 $27,821
University of Mass. 4 504 604 512 616 8,806
State colleges 7 454 551 454 551 5,474
Source: NCES’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
private colleges, either that the state suffers from net brain drain or that it would benefit
by diverting students from private to public colleges.
To understand why legislators might be concerned about the difference between pub-
lic and private colleges in Massachusetts, consider Table 2, which compares the enrollment-
weighted mean characteristics of three categories of BA-granting four-year colleges.12
SAT scores (which range from 200 to 800) show that private colleges attract a much more
talented set of students than do state colleges, with a more than 60-point difference in both
verbal and math scores at the 25th and 75th percentiles.13 The U. Mass. campuses look
more similar to private colleges than do other state colleges, at least at the 75th percentile
of SAT scores. Talented students are thus found at both sets of institutions.
I show in Section 6 that the Adams Scholarship’s primary effect was to attract to the U.
Mass. campuses students in the 60-79th percentiles of academic ability. The scholarship
thus failed to attract any new students to state colleges and failed to attract many students
above the 80th percentile of academic ability to the U. Mass. campuses. In fact, had the
scholarship taken the original form proposed, with a state-wide rather than a district-
12I limit the comparison to four-year colleges because the scholarship’s effect is limited to those student
attending four-year colleges, as will be seen in Sections 4 and 5.
13This comparison is certainly skewed by the fact that Massachusetts’ private colleges attract a large
number of talented students from out of state. Ideally I could compare these institutions on the basis of
enrollment by only Massachusetts students. Unfortunately, IPEDS does not permit this comparison.
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wide cutoff score, almost no scholarships would have been awarded to students in the
60-79th percentiles, so that the program’s effect would have been much smaller than it
ultimately was.
3 The Data
The data was compiled by the Massachusetts Department of Education, combining its
Student Information Managements System, which records every student’s demographic
variables and post-graduate intentions, with information on each student’s MCAS scores
and Adams Scholarship eligibility. The original data set contains 171,786 students: the
complete classes of 2003 and 2004, who graduated prior to the existence of the Adams
Scholarship, and the class of 2005, the first class of students eligible for the Adams Schol-
arship. For every student, the data contains: gender; race; a poverty indicator (based on
whether the student qualifies for free or reduced price lunch); a vocational education in-
dicator (based on the student’s enrollment in a career/vocational educational program); a
special education indicator (based on whether the student is officially registered with his
school district as having special needs); an English-as-second-language indicator; English
and math MCAS scores; the MCAS cutoff score for scholarship eligibility in that student’s
school district (for the class of 2005); and the student’s post-graduation plans, as reported
by his high school’s guidance department at the end of his senior year. Each student is
also assigned a randomized school district number, which allows me to identify which
students came from the same school district while not identifying the district itself.
Post-graduation plans, the outcome variable of interest in this paper, fall into one of
9 categories: four-year public college; two-year public college; four-year private college;
two-year private college; other postsecondary (trade school); work; military; other (e.g.,
travel, family); or plans unknown. I assign students to a graduating class based on when
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their guidance departments reported their post-graduation plans. In cleaning the data, I
removed 8,529 students whose MCAS scores were missing, as well as another 2,293 whose
school district or post-graduation plan could not be determined. This leaves 93.7% of the
original data, consisting of 160,964 graduating seniors from Massachusetts, over 50,000
each from the classes of 2003, 2004 and 2005. I label students as being from “medium
poverty” districts if their graduating class had a poverty rate between 20% and 40% and
“high poverty” districts if their graduating class had a poverty rate higher than 40%.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the entire classes of 2003, 2004 and 2005, as well
as for subpopulations of the class of 2004, which will serve as a base year from which
to judge the effects of the Adams Scholarship. All variables listed are dummy variables,
except for MCAS scores. The first three columns of Table 3 suggest that, of graduating
seniors in Massachusetts, roughly 7% are black, 6% are Hispanic, and over 20% come
from medium- or high-poverty school districts. Over 75% attend college, with somewhat
more than half of those attending public colleges. About three-fifths of those who attend
public college attend four-year public colleges, with the remainder attending two-year
public colleges. In contrast, those who attend private colleges almost all attend four-year
private colleges. Finally, MCAS scores appear to increase with time.
In the last six columns of Table 3, I analyze various subpopulations of the class of
2004. These figures reveal that women attend college more frequently than men, that
most black and Hispanic seniors graduate from high-poverty school districts, and that
such students have noticeably lower MCAS scores and college attendance rates. This
suggests that heterogeneity in response to the Adams Scholarship will be an important
phenomenon to consider.
To check that students’ reported postsecondary intentions reflect actual college at-
tendance, I used the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































secondary institutions by state of residence. According to IPEDS, 46,846 Massachusetts
students started college in 2004, a slightly higher number than the 41,912 reported in
my SIMS data, due largely to students I discarded and the fact that IPEDS includes stu-
dents attending private high schools and those who have taken some time off between
high school and college. The proportions of students attending various categories of col-
lege are, however, nearly identical in the IPEDS and SIMS data. According to IPEDS
(SIMS), the proportion of Massachusetts seniors attending four-year public college is
32.0% (32.9%), two-year public college is 22.6% (21.5%), four-year private college is 43.2%
(42.3%), and two-year private college is 2.2% (3.2%). This confirms that reported inten-
tions reflect actual enrollment decisions.
The outcome variable does, however, suffer from two limitations. First, the categories
are broad, so that more detailed questions concerning the chosen colleges’ characteris-
tics, like selectivity and price, can not be explored further. The second is that, according
to IPEDS, though 97% of students attending “two-year public college” are doing so in-
state, only 72% of those attending “four-year public college” are doing so in-state. Over a
quarter of that latter category thus comprises students attending public colleges outside
of Massachusetts, preventing perfect identification of students attending in-state public
college.
4 Difference-in-Difference Methodology and Results
Estimation of the Adams Scholarship’s effects through comparison of the post-secondary
plans of scholarship winners and losers would be heavily biased by the omission of aca-
demic ability as an explanatory variable. I eliminate this bias by constructing a difference-
in-difference estimator comparing scholarship winners to losers in the year before and
after the scholarship’s introduction. To do this, I create a dummy variable WINij , equal to
17
1 for any 2005 graduate i in district j who won the Adams Scholarship as well as for 2003
and 2004 graduates who would have won, according to their test scores, had the schol-
arship been in place in those years. To impute this value to the 2003 and 2004 graduates,
I determine whether each student passed the proficient/advanced threshold and scored
in the top 25% of his school district in his graduation year. The identifying assumption
of the difference-in-difference approach is that, according to the construction of WINij ,
between 2004 and 2005 nothing other than the Adams Scholarship affected the difference
in college enrollment patterns between winners and losers.
Two facts might interfere with identification. First, because MCAS scores were lower
in 2003 and 2004 so that fewer students passed the proficient/advanced threshold, a
smaller fraction of those students would have been scholarship winners based on my
construction of WINij . This is confirmed in the bottom row of Table 3, where the pro-
portion of students labeled winners rises from 19.6% to 23.9% over the three years. This
could bias the difference-in-difference estimator if WINij identifies slightly different parts
of the ability distribution in different years. I will address this potential bias further below
both with a regression discontinuity approach, using only a single year of data, and with
regressions including a students’ rank in the ability distribution. A second source of bias
would arise if scholarship winners systematically included more students who had tried,
as Kane (2003) puts it, to “claw” their way above the thresholds. This is ruled out here
both because the program was announced over a year after the class of 2005 had taken
their MCAS exams and because each district’s cutoff score was a random variable that no
student could predict ahead of time.14
Based on the construction of WINij , Table 4 contains summary statistics for the three
graduating classes, separated by winners and losers. Scholarship winners are much less
14There is some evidence that manipulation of the system began for later scholarship classes. One ed-
ucation official told me of an assistant principal who had transferred her 10th grade daughter to a lower-
performing school district in order to guarantee that she win an Adams Scholarship.
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likely than losers to be black or Hispanic, to be poor, and to be enrolled in special or
vocational education programs. These demographics differences seem relatively stable
over time. More interesting is the change over time in students’ post-graduation plans.
About 95% of winners plan to attend college, compared to 74% of losers, proportions
that are relatively stable over time. Only 4% of scholarship winners attend public and
private two-year colleges, a proportion that is also stable. What does change, however,
is the proportion of winners attending four-year public and private colleges. These pro-
portions, roughly 30% and 60% respectively, barely shift from 2003 to 2004, but change
dramatically to 37% and 54% in 2005. No such change is observed among the losers, sug-
gesting that scholarship winners in 2005 were affected by something other than a time
trend differentially affecting winners and losers. The only plausible cause is the Adams
Scholarship.
I confirm these differences in means in Table 5, comparing winners to losers by class in
the first three columns, then computing differences between classes in those winner/loser
differences in the final three columns. Column (4) suggests that between 2003 and 2004,
there may have been some trend among winners (compared to losers) to move to pub-
lic colleges and away from private ones. Column (5) suggests, however, that this trend
increased markedly from 2004 to 2005. Column (6) shows the difference-in-difference-in-
difference between winners and losers, between the classes of 2004 and 2005, and between
the classes of 2003 and 2004. This estimate suggests that the Adams Scholarship raised
attendance rates at public colleges by 3.1 percentage points while lowering private col-
lege attendance by 5.0 percentage points. This effect is certainly in the expected direction,
though it does lead to the odd conclusion that the Adams Scholarship reduced the overall
college attendance rate by 1.9 percentage points.
One problem with the raw differences presented in Table 5 is that, as shown in Table
4, the characteristics of winners and losers did change somewhat between graduating
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Table 4: Mean Characteristics of Adams Scholarship Winners and Losers
Winners Losers
Class of Class of Class of Class of Class of Class of
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Demographics
Female 0.566 0.525 0.535 0.507 0.503 0.508
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Black 0.018 0.022 0.029 0.077 0.079 0.08
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.07 0.071 0.08
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Poverty 0.049 0.064 0.078 0.152 0.164 0.189
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium Poverty District 0.039 0.063 0.079 0.097 0.119 0.12
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
High Poverty District 0.080 0.090 0.121 0.123 0.133 0.157
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English as Second Language 0.057 0.065 0.076 0.108 0.109 0.121
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Special Education 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.121 0.149 0.148
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vocational Education 0.057 0.059 0.064 0.222 0.217 0.200
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Limited English Proficiency 0.012 0.002 0.019 0.025 0.024 0.043
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College Choice
Any College 0.940 0.951 0.956 0.729 0.735 0.754
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Public College 0.324 0.338 0.408 0.454 0.449 0.469
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Private College 0.616 0.613 0.548 0.275 0.286 0.285
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Four-Year Public College 0.301 0.307 0.371 0.246 0.243 0.249
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Two-Year Public College 0.023 0.031 0.037 0.208 0.205 0.220
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Four-Year Private College 0.610 0.604 0.544 0.248 0.256 0.259
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Two-Year Private College 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.027 0.030 0.026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MCAS Scores
MCAS Score - English 262.715 263.822 263.301 236.633 239.626 241.286
(0.082) (0.080) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067)
MCAS Score - Math 262.353 262.999 264.014 235.115 234.614 237.718
(0.061) (0.063) (0.056) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077)
MCAS Score - Total 525.068 526.821 527.314 471.748 474.24 479.003
(0.105) (0.106) (0.094) (0.129) (0.128) (0.127)
Adams Scholarship Variables
Proficient/Advanced 1 1 1 0.082 0.113 0.132
() () () (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Adams Scholarship Winner 1 1 1 0 0 0
() () () () () ()
Sample Size 10,348 11,338 13,041 42,402 42,377 41,458
Standard errors are listed below the estimates of population means.
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Table 5: Mean Differences between Winners and Losers and between Classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D DD DDD
Winners - Losers, Class of
2003 2004 2005 (2) - (1) (3) - (2) (5) - (4)
Any College 0.211** 0.216** 0.202** 0.006 -0.014* -0.019*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Public College -0.130** -0.111** -0.061** 0.019** 0.050** 0.031**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Private College 0.341** 0.327** 0.263** -0.014* -0.064** -0.050**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Sample Size 52,750 53,715 54,499 106,465 108,214 160,964
Standard errors are reported below mean differences (* p<0.05 ** p<0.01).
classes. To control better for student characteristics, I construct a difference-in-difference
estimator by running the regression
Yij = α + β(2005ij ∗WINij) + γ2005ij + δWINij + ψXij + ij (1)
where Yij is a dummy variable equal to one if student i in district j attends a particular cat-
egory of college, 2005ij is a dummy variable equal to one for 2005 graduates and 0 for 2004
graduates (I ignore 2003 graduates here), WINij is the variable mentioned earlier, and Xij
are demographic controls. In the regressions that follow, I allow for heteroscedasticity by
reporting robust standard errors and I cluster by school district to allow for intra-district
correlation in the error terms ij .
The top half of Table 6 shows the results of the regressions from (1). The coefficient
of interest is β, the interaction between WINij and 2005ij , which under the identifying
assumptions represents the effect of receiving the Adams Scholarship. Including a full
set of demographic controls does not change these estimates much, except for rendering
insignificant the result that the scholarship reduced the overall college attendance rate.
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Table 6: DD Regressions of College Plans on Class and Scholarship Status
Class of 2005 vs. Class of 2004 (N=108,214)
Four-Year Two-Year Four-Year Two-Year
Any Public Private Public Public Private Private
College College College College College College College
Without Demographic Controls
Winner * 2005 -0.014* 0.050** -0.064** 0.058** -0.009 -0.062** -0.001
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)
Class of 2005 0.019** 0.020* -0.001 0.005 0.015* 0.003 -0.004
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004)
Winner 0.216** -0.111** 0.327** 0.064** -0.175** 0.348** -0.021**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003)
R2 0.047 0.006 0.067 0.009 0.039 0.079 0.004
With Demographic Controls
Winner * 2005 -0.010 0.051** -0.061** 0.060** -0.010 -0.059** -0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)
Class of 2005 0.020** 0.020 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004)
Winner 0.144** -0.135** 0.280** 0.016 -0.152** 0.297** -0.017**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
R2 0.149 0.015 0.106 0.038 0.054 0.122 0.010
Class of 2004 vs. Class of 2003 (N=106,465)
Four-Year Two-Year Four-Year Two-Year
Any Public Private Public Public Private Private
College College College College College College College
Without Demographic Controls
Winner * 2004 0.006 0.019 -0.014 0.008 0.011 -0.014 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002)
Class of 2004 0.005 -0.006 0.011 -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Winner 0.211** -0.130** 0.341** 0.055** -0.186** 0.362** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002)
R2 0.043 0.010 0.080 0.003 0.037 0.093 0.003
With Demographic Controls
Winner * 2004 0.006 0.019 -0.013 0.007 0.012* -0.013 0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002)
Class of 2004 0.012 -0.004 0.016 0.002 -0.006 0.014 0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Winner 0.138** -0.161** 0.299** 0.007 -0.168** 0.316** -0.017**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
R2 0.145 0.023 0.113 0.035 0.048 0.131 0.007
Robust standard errors clustered by school district are reported below coefficients (* p<0.05 ** p<0.01).
Demographic controls are those referred to in Table 3.
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Table 6 suggests that the primary effect of the Adams Scholarship was to raise the propor-
tion of winners attending four-year public colleges by 6.0 percentage points while low-
ering the proportion attending four-year private colleges by a nearly identical amount.
The overall college attendance rate was thus unchanged by the scholarship, an unsur-
prising result given that over 95% of winners already planned to attend college. There is
also little evidence that the scholarship induced students to increase the number of years
of college they intended to pursue, given the insignificant coefficients on the two-year
college categories.
Note that, by this estimate, about 780 students (6.0% of the 13,041 2005 winners) were
induced to switch from private to public colleges. According to the data, 5,318 (40.8%)
of the 2005 scholarship winners attended public college and thus used their scholarship.
This suggests that only 15% (=780/5,318) of scholarship users changed their behavior
due to the scholarship, while the remaining 85% had their previous behavior subsidized
by the state. The marginal effect of this scholarship is thus small in comparison to the
inframarginal effect, similar to the findings in Georgia of Cornwell et al. (2006).
Interpretation of these effects as causal, rather than due to some trend in the differ-
ences between winners and losers, is bolstered by the bottom half of Table 6, where the
same regressions are run for comparison between the classes of 2004 and 2003, neither of
which was eligible for the Adams Scholarship. In this case, only one of the interaction
coefficients is significant, suggesting that the coefficients in the top half of Table 6 are not
attributable to any confounding trends.
To investigate whether reactions to the Adams Scholarship are heterogeneous, Table 7
shows the same regressions as Table 6 run separately for various subgroups of the student
population. Table 7 shows that blacks, poor students, and students from high-poverty
districts react more strongly to the scholarship than does the general population, whereas
women, Hispanics, and students from medium-poverty districts react only slightly, if at
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all, more strongly. Specifically, the scholarship raises the public college attendance rate
by 18 percentage points among black students (from a base rate of 20%), 13 percentage
points among poor students (from a base rate of 28%), and 9 percentage points among
students in high-poverty districts (from a base rate of 28%).
5 Regression Discontinuity Methodology and Results
As mentioned above, the primary disadvantage of the difference-in-difference approach
in (1) is that WINij may identify slightly different parts of the ability distribution in dif-
ferent years. A regression discontinuity design eliminates this concern by focusing only
on the class of 2005. I exploit the fact that scholarship receipt is a discontinuous function
of a student’s test scores due to the proficient/advanced and district cutoff thresholds.
Students whose scores place them just inside the dark regions in Figure 1 are likely quite
similar in terms of academic ability to students whose scores place them just outside those
regions, yet the former receive the scholarship and the latter do not. Given that academic
ability is one of the most powerful determinants of a student’s college attendance deci-
sion, a regression discontinuity design allows me to eliminate an important source of bias
when comparing scholarship winners and losers.
The major hurdle here is the complexity of the various thresholds that students must
achieve in order to win the Adams Scholarship. To simplify the analysis, I will first ignore
the proficient/advanced threshold and consider only whether students have met their
districts’ cutoff scores. Previous papers, such as Kane (2003) and van der Klaauw (2001),
consider financial aid that is granted once students pass a single threshold that is applied
uniformly. Here, the location of the discontinuity varies by district. To account for this
variation, I define
GAPij = TOTALij − CUTOFFj (2)
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Table 7: DD Regressions of College Plans on Class and Scholarship Status, by Subgroup
Four-Year Two-Year Four-Year Two-Year
Any Public Private Public Public Private Private
Subgroup College College College College College College College
All students (2005 vs. 2004) -0.010 0.051** -0.061** 0.060** -0.010 -0.059** -0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)
All students (2004 vs. 2003) 0.006 0.019 -0.013 0.007 0.012* -0.013 0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=11,338) 0.951 0.338 0.613 0.307 0.031 0.604 0.009
Women (2005 vs. 2004) -0.013* 0.061** -0.073** 0.072** -0.012 -0.069** -0.004
(0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003)
Women (2004 vs. 2003) 0.008 -0.001 0.010 -0.009 0.007 0.008 0.002
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=5,954) 0.969 0.307 0.662 0.282 0.025 0.652 0.010
Blacks (2005 vs. 2004) -0.024 0.147** -0.170** 0.179** -0.033 -0.180** 0.010
(0.020) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.023) (0.039) (0.007)
Blacks (2004 vs. 2003) 0.073 0.001 0.072* -0.025 0.026 0.081* -0.009
(0.044) (0.049) (0.034) (0.039) (0.019) (0.038) (0.012)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=246) 0.927 0.224 0.703 0.199 0.024 0.695 0.008
Hispanics (2005 vs. 2004) -0.034 0.071 -0.105* 0.081 -0.010 -0.093* -0.012
(0.029) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.024) (0.040) (0.017)
Hispanics (2004 vs. 2003) 0.075* 0.077 -0.002 0.046 0.031 -0.006 0.004
(0.038) (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.033) (0.046) (0.010)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=206) 0.927 0.340 0.587 0.262 0.078 0.573 0.015
Poor Students (2005 vs. 2004) 0.009 0.110** -0.101** 0.131** -0.022 -0.098** -0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011)
Poor Students (2004 vs. 2003) 0.056* 0.041 0.015 0.011 0.030 0.013 0.002
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.017) (0.029) (0.007)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=722) 0.889 0.346 0.543 0.278 0.068 0.528 0.015
Med. Pov. Districts (2005 vs. 2004) 0.024 0.114** -0.089** 0.077** 0.036 -0.088** -0.001
(0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010)
Med. Pov. Districts (2004 vs. 2003) -0.078* -0.054 -0.024 -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.001
(0.031) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.026) (0.045) (0.006)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=711) 0.900 0.391 0.509 0.350 0.041 0.501 0.008
High Pov. Districts (2005 vs. 2004) -0.031 0.041 -0.073** 0.092** -0.051 -0.082** 0.010
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.009)
High Pov. Districts (2004 vs. 2003) 0.096** 0.054 0.042 0.045 0.008 0.048 -0.005
(0.031) (0.034) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (0.010)
Mean for 2004 winners (N=1,021) 0.911 0.312 0.598 0.284 0.028 0.589 0.010
Robust standard errors clustered by school district are reported below coefficients (* p<0.05 ** p<0.01).
All regressions include the demographic controls referred to in Table 3.
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where TOTALij represents the total MCAS score of student i in district j and CUTOFFj
represents the cutoff score of district j, so that GAPij measures the extent to which student
i has exceeded his district’s cutoff score. This allows students to be ordered according to
GAPij and implies that the probability of winning an Adams Scholarship has the property
P
 = 0, if GAPij < 0≈ 1, if GAPij ≥ 0
Achieving the threshold of GAPij ≥ 0 does not necessarily imply that P = 1 because
some fraction of those students may not have achieved the proficient/advanced thresh-
old. This thus constitutes a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in which the treatment
is not completely determined by the assignment variable. The top left panel of Figure 2
illustrates this by showing the proportion of 2005 graduates winning the Adams Scholar-
ship as a function of GAPij .15 Students with GAPij < 0 have no chance of winning the
scholarship, while 74.8% of those with GAPij = 0 win it, implying that 25.2% of the latter
have failed to meet the proficient/advanced threshold.
The remaining three panels of Figure 2 graph college decisions as a function of GAPij ,
and their overall shapes are worth noting given that GAPij is basically a measure of aca-
demic ability. The top right panel shows that the fraction attending college rises monoton-
ically with ability, leveling off at about 95% for the highest ability students. The bottom
panels show that the fraction attending four-year public colleges rises with ability up to
a maximum of 40% and then drops dramatically for very high ability students, while
the fraction attending four-year private colleges rises monotonically with ability. These
bottom panels together suggest that public and private colleges have roughly similar ap-
15I dropped from the 2005 graduates 15 students whose scholarship status and test scores are incompat-
ible. They were likely assigned to the wrong school district in the original data. Unsurprisingly, given the
size of the sample, no results below are affected by this. For graphical purposes, I show only the portion of














































































Figure 2: Class of 2005’s College Decisions vs. GAPij
peal to the middle of the ability distribution, but that high ability students have strong
preferences for private colleges, some subset of which are highly selective and therefore
prestigious.
This fuzzy design shows no obvious discontinuity in the overall college attendance
rate, though there may be discontinuities in attendance of four-year public and private
colleges. That these discontinuities are visually subtle suggests identification might ben-
efit from sharpening of the design. In a sharp regression discontinuity design, the assign-
ing variable perfectly determines treatment status, thus eliminating the need to divide
outcome differences by treatment probability differences. The challenge here is to create










































































Figure 3: Class of 2005’s College Decisions vs. GAP∗ij
ship has the property
P
 = 0, if GAP
∗
ij < 0
= 1, if GAP ∗ij ≥ 0
To do this, I first define
BESTij = max(MATHij, ENGij)
WORSTij = min(MATHij, ENGij)
where MATHij and ENGij are a student’s scores on the math and English portions of
the MCAS, so that BESTij and WORSTij represent the best and worst of her two scores
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respectively. I then define
GAP ∗ij = min(GAPij, BESTij − 260,WORSTij − 240) (3)
which assigns to each student a number representing the distance by which she failed
most or succeeded least to meet one of the thresholds (recall that 260 is the advanced
threshold and that 240 is the proficient threshold).16 By this definition, any student with
GAP∗ij < 0 fails to win a scholarship, while any student with GAP∗ij ≥ 0 has passed all the
necessary thresholds and is thus guaranteed a scholarship. Figure 3 replicates Figure 2,
but this time using GAP∗ij instead of GAPij . The result is now a perfectly sharp regression
discontinuity design, and the discontinuities in the graphs of four-year public and private
college attendance have become much clearer.
To check that these discontinuities are not simply artifacts of the construction of GAP∗ij ,
I perform the same graphical analysis on the class of 2004, the results of which appear in
Figure 4. These students were not eligible for the scholarship and graphs of their college
attendance outcomes show little or no discontinuities, in spite of the sharp regression
discontinuity design being applied. Figure 5 presents one final graphical check of the va-
lidity of the regression discontinuity design, using demographics as dependent variables.
Regression discontinuity designs depend fundamentally on the assumption that subjects’
underlying characteristics change smoothly as the threshold of interest is crossed. Figure
5 suggests that the construction of GAP∗ij leaves this assumption roughly intact, though
there seems to be some rise in the number of students living in high-poverty school dis-
tricts above the threshold.
To quantify the effect of the discontinuity more rigorously, I run regressions of the























































































k + βkIGAP ∗ij≥0 × (GAP ∗ij)k
)
+ ij (4)
whereD determines the degree of the polynomial in GAP∗ij that is fully interacted with an
indicator variable for crossing the threshold of GAP∗ij = 0. The coefficient of most interest
will thus be β0, which (as I discuss in more detail below) measures a weighted average
effect of winning the scholarship.
The first four columns of Table 8 show the values of β0 for the 2005 graduates using D
= 1, 2, 3 and 4. Larger values of D change the coefficients very little, and the goodness-
of-fit statistic suggested by Lee and Card (2007) reveals that D = 4 is generally the first
specification not rejected at a 5% significance level. I thus take the fourth-degree polyno-
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Table 8: RD Regressions of College Plans and Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
College Choice D=1 D=2 D=3 D=4 D=1 D=4
Any College 0.017* 0.017 0.031** 0.016 -0.005 -0.007
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
R2 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.029 0.127
Public College 0.033** 0.094** 0.098** 0.092** 0.097** -0.002
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
R2 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.020
Private College -0.016 -0.077** -0.067** -0.077** -0.103** -0.005
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
R2 0.102 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.050 0.122
Four-Year Public College 0.057** 0.052** 0.074** 0.078** 0.089** 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
R2 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.013 0.060
Two-Year Public College -0.024** 0.041** 0.024** 0.014 0.009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
R2 0.084 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.033 0.074
Four-Year Private College -0.011 -0.080** -0.069** -0.078** -0.102** -0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
R2 0.122 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.054 0.146
Two-Year Private College -0.005** 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.007
Demographics D=1 D=2 D=3 D=4 D=1 D=4
Female -0.008 0.005 0.012 -0.020 -0.027 -0.005
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
R2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
Black 0.018* 0.019 0.007 0.013** 0.011 -0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
R2 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.004 0.030
Hispanic 0.014** 0.014* -0.011* -0.013* -0.004 -0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.003 0.030
Poverty 0.031** 0.029* -0.012 -0.004 0.012 -0.005
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
R2 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.007 0.052
Medium Poverty District 0.007 0.035** 0.010 -0.002 0.015 -0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.014
High Poverty District 0.046 0.057* 0.002 -0.004 0.029 -0.020
(0.027) (0.023) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
R2 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.001 0.020
English as 2nd Language 0.020** 0.011 -0.017* -0.013 -0.003 -0.016*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
R2 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.018
Special Education 0.064** -0.016** -0.018** 0.041** 0.010* 0.037**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
R2 0.159 0.175 0.175 0.179 0.013 0.207
Vocational Education -0.014 0.041** 0.003 -0.004 0.026** -0.018
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
R2 0.047 0.050 0.052 0.052 0.018 0.063
Limited English Proficiency 0.020* 0.006 -0.007** 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
R2 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.001 0.022
N 54,484 54,484 54,484 54,484 27,885 53,715































































Figure 5: Class of 2005’s Demographics vs. GAPij
mial in column (4) as my preferred specification.17 Crossing the threshold clearly induces
discontinuities in a number of outcomes for 2005 graduates. The most remarkable result
is that the coefficients on four-year public and private colleges have identical point esti-
mates with opposite signs, though the magnitude of 7.8% is higher than the 6.0% from
the difference-in-difference estimate.18 To eliminate the effect of students far below the
threshold, I limit the sample in column (5) to 2005 graduates for whom |GAP ∗ij| ≤ 20. In
this case, a simple linear specification (D = 1) yields even higher point estimates of an 8.9
percentage point increase in four-year public colleges and a 10.2 percentage point drop in
17I ignore any specification error arising from the fact the GAP∗ij is not perfectly continuous but is mea-
sured only in increments of 2. For more on the complications arising due to specification error, see Lee and
Card (2007).
18There is also some evidence in Table 8 that the scholarship increased the total college attendance rate by
inducing students to attend two-year public colleges who might not have attended any college otherwise.
This effect is, however, sensitive to the chosen specification.
32
four-year private colleges. In column (6) I replicate column (4) using 2004 graduates and,
as expected, no effect is seen.
The fact that the scholarship’s effect seems larger in the regression discontinuity speci-
fication than in the difference-in-difference specification could have two causes. First, the
size of the discontinuity may be partly capturing discontinuous changes in underlying
student characteristics. The bottom half of Table 8 shows that certain demographic char-
acteristics, such as race and special education status, also change discontinuously at the
threshold. These demographic discontinuities occur, however, in populations that repre-
sent an extremely small fraction of the total population of winners (see Table 4), making
this an unlikely source of practically significant bias in the estimates.
Second and more important is that, as discussed by Lee (2007), β0 actually estimates a
weighted average treatment effect where the weights are determined by an individual’s
likelihood of having a value of GAP∗ij close to zero. In other words, the size of the dis-
continuity is more closely related to the scholarship’s effect on those students likely to
fall near the threshold than on those far away from it. These students near the threshold
represent the low end of the ability distribution of the winners (and the high end of the
losers). The difference-in-difference approach measured the average treatment effect of
the scholarship where the average was taken over the entire pool of scholarship winners.
Comparison of these two approaches might thus suggest that the scholarship had a larger
impact on students with lower academic ability levels.
6 Heterogeneity By Academic Ability
To test this hypothesis directly, I return to the difference-in-difference methodology but
add one more layer of interactions, namely with a measure of academic ability. I assign to
2004 and 2005 graduates variables indicating which of the 10 ability deciles within their
33
class they fall into based on their total MCAS scores. I then interact these indicators fully
with 2005ij and WINij to create a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate of the
effect of being a scholarship winner (compared to loser) in 2005 (compared to 2004) and
in a given ability decile (compared to the other deciles). Because scholarship winners in
2005 are drawn from above the 60th ability percentile, I compute results for the top four
deciles: 60-69, 70-79, 80-89, and 90-99.
Table 9 shows the result of these regressions, where each coefficient represents a sepa-
rate regression run by treating that particular ability decile as the omitted category. Het-
erogeneity in students’ responses to the Adams Scholarship is clear. The scholarship in-
duces switching from private to public colleges in roughly 10-15% of the lowest ability
scholarship winners, those in the 60-69th and 70-79th deciles. The effect on students in
the 80-89th decile is 7%, or half of that magnitude. The coefficient on the highest abil-
ity decile is less than 2% and not significantly different from zero, suggesting that those
students’ college decisions were unaffected by scholarship receipt. Interestingly, this het-
erogeneity analysis also suggests that the scholarship may have raised college attendance
rates by 2-3% among students in the 70-79th and 80-89th deciles.
Recall that the original difference-in-difference analysis suggested that the scholarship
induced 6% of winners to switch from private to public colleges. The top panel of Table 9
reveals that this estimate is actually an average of highly responsive students among the
lowest ability winners and nonresponsive students among the highest ability winners.19
This confirms the hypothesis above that the regression discontinuity design captured an
effect weighted more heavily for the lowest ability scholarship winners.
Apart from explaining the regression discontinuity results, the heterogeneity analysis
19High ability students may not be totally unresponsive. If I divide the highest ability students more
finely, I find the coefficient on students in the 90-94th percentiles is not significantly different from zero, but
that the coefficient on those in the 95-99th percentiles is significantly positive, though small. This could be
evidence that the very highest ability students are attracted to honors colleges that some U. Mass. campuses



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































also provides some insight into the decision-making processes of high school graduates.
The simplest explanation for the observed pattern of heterogeneity by academic ability is
that students trade off quality and price when deciding which college to attend. Many of
the highest ability students have presumably gained admission to highly selective private
colleges. The perceived quality drop they would incur by switching to a public college
is likely too large to be worth the small price reduction the Adams Scholarship offers.
Conversely, the lowest ability scholarship winners are more likely to have gained admis-
sion to private colleges similar in quality to Massachusetts’ public colleges. For some of
those students, the perceived quality drop a switch to the public sector would incur is
small enough that the Adams Scholarship makes such a switch worthwhile.20 The pat-
tern of heterogeneity in Table 9 is suggestive, though not conclusive, that students are
considering such price and quality tradeoffs when making college decisions.
The heterogeneity by academic ability may also largely explain why low-income stu-
dents seem more price sensitive than other students, given that ability and income are
positively correlated. To test this, the bottom two panels of Table 9 repeat the regres-
sions of the top panel with the sample of students now divided by poverty status. The
coefficients derived by omitting low-income students from the sample are statistically
indistinguishable from those derived from the full sample, suggesting that low-income
students are not driving the heterogeneity seen in Table 9. Though the sample limited
only to low-income students has little power because so few poor students win schol-
arships, a couple of observations may still be made. In the 60-69th and 70-79th ability
deciles, where some of the poor students’ coefficients are statistically significant, the point
estimates are not statistically different from those of the non-poor students. This suggests
20I implicitly assume in these scenarios that private colleges will cost more than their public counter-
parts, even accounting for financial aid packages. It is of course conceivable that a student offered a full
scholarship to a low quality private college might switch to a higher quality public college if the Adams
Scholarship represented a sufficient price reduction.
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that the earlier indication of poor students’ higher price sensitivity may simply be picking
up correlations between poverty and relatively low test scores. Conversely, though none
are statistically significant, the point estimates for the 80-89th decile have the wrong sign,
while those in the 90-99th decile are much larger than for the non-poor students. Taken
as a whole, these results provide little evidence that low-income students are more price
sensitive than other students of similar academic ability. These results highlight the im-
portance in future research of attempting to separate the effects of income and academic
ability.
7 Conclusions
The above analysis allows me both to evaluate how effective the Adams Scholarship was
at achieving Massachusetts’ stated goals and to suggest improvement for future design of
merit-based scholarships. The state spent around $8 million in the scholarship’s first year
and estimates that annual spending will total $30 million once all four years of students
are using it. The state thus spent roughly $10,250 (=$8,000,000/780) per student who
switched from the private to public sector. This seems large relative to any benefit such
switching might bring to the state and suggests that Massachusetts, like Georgia, should
consider more carefully targeting its financial aid.
That the state spent $8 million on the 2005 scholarships allows one further calculation.
According to the data, of the 5,318 scholarship users, 4,838 went to four-year colleges
and 480 went to two-year colleges. Based on Table 1, the 480 winners attending two-
year colleges cost the state $350,000 (=480*$740), leaving $7.65 million spent on winners
attending four-year colleges, or about $1,580 (=$7,650,000/4,838) per winner. Given that
the average annual tuition of the U. Mass. campuses was $1,575 while state college tuition
averaged $961, this suggests that nearly all of those using the scholarship at four-year
37
public colleges were attending not state colleges but U. Mass. campuses where, as Table 2
shows, the upper end of the ability distribution is not so different from the private sector.21
This makes sense given that scholarship winners have little reason to choose state col-
leges over U. Mass. campuses. The former do not cost much less but are less selective
and thus less well-regarded. Given that the effects were strongest for lower ability win-
ners, a simple explanation of their high price sensitivity is that those students induced to
switch were doing so from private colleges of roughly the same quality as the U. Mass.
campuses. Those students of highest ability were less sensitive likely because they would
have had to accept a larger drop in quality from the set of private colleges to which they
gained admission.
In sum, the Adams Scholarship will spend $30 million annually to leave college atten-
dance rates unchanged while paying 85% of recipients to attend the college they would
have chosen anyway and the remaining 15% to attend colleges in the public sector rather
than the private sector. This is not a sensible use of the state budget. Most states, includ-
ing Massachusetts, could design more efficient and tightly targeted aid programs by first
examining the college attendance patterns of their students, broken down as in Table 10
by income and rank in the distribution of academic ability.
For Massachusetts, Table 10 shows two important facts. The first is that low-income
21I can use this information to calculate an elasticity of substitution from private to public colleges, as-
suming that all students switched from four-year private colleges to U. Mass. campuses and that the Adams
Scholarship was not crowded out by decreased forms of other financial aid. Furthermore, I use only the 91%
of scholarship winners who had already decided to attend a four-year college, given that this is the popula-
tion of interest. Within this population, Table 4 suggests that absent the scholarship, 33.7% (=30.7%/91.1%)
would have attended public college and 66.3% (=60.4%/91.1%) would have attended private college. The
scholarship would have shifted these proportions to 40.3% (=36.7%/91.1%) and 59.7% (=54.4%/91.1%)
respectively, proportional changes of +19.6% (=(40.3-33.7)/33.7) and -10% (=(59.7-66.3)/66.3). Under the
above assumptions, the Adams Scholarship reduced the price of public college by 17.1% (according to
Table 1). Thus, for the population of scholarship winners intent on attending four-year colleges, the own-
price elasticity of demand for attendance at U. Mass. campuses is -1.1 (=19.6/-17.1), while the cross-price
elasticity of demand for attendance at private colleges (with respect to the price of public college) is 0.6
(=-10.0/-17.1). The true elasticities are even larger for the lower ability winners, and would be larger than




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































students in the upper half of the ability distribution attend four-year colleges at a notice-
ably lower rate than do their peers of similar academic ability. This gap ranges from 7
to 15 percentage points for such students, suggesting that Massachusetts should consider
targeting aid toward low-income students in those upper percentiles. If the goal of these
state policies is to efficiently produce human capital, then states should target precisely
those students who have high ability but low college attendance rates.
The second, and perhaps more important, lesson from Table 10 is in its bottom-most
row, which shows that low-income students are heavily bunched in the lowest part of
the ability distribution. Given that non-low-income students are relatively uniformly dis-
tributed along this distribution, Table 10 suggests that children of low-income families
are severely disadvantaged relative to their peers by the time they reach the 10th grade.
Recent research, as summarized in Cunha et al. (2005), argues that efforts at remedying
human capital inequalities might yield greater returns if targeted at disadvantaged chil-
dren when they are young. Under this view, the money currently spent on the Adams
Scholarship and other merit-based aid programs might be better used to remedy the abil-
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